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Rewriting California Groundwater Law: Past
Attempts and Prerequisites to Reform
ZACHARY

A.

SMITH*

INTRODUCTION

Of approximately thirty-one million acre-feet' of both surface
and groundwater used in California in a normal year, roughly
forty percent (40%) comes from the ground. 2 Much of this supply
comes from groundwater basins that are being overdrafted, in
other words, where the extraction of groundwater is at rates in
excess of the natural recharge. There are numerous undesirable
effects that can result from such long-term overdrafting of ground
water basins. Generally these include: salt water intrusion 3 (the
salinization of supplies), land subsidence 4 (the settling or sinking
* Dr. Smith is currently an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii at Hilo. B.A., California State University, Fullerton, 1976; M.A.,
University of California, Santa Barbara, 1979; Ph.D., University of California, Santa
Barbara, 1983.
1. An acre-foot is the quantity of water that would cover one acre to the depth
of one foot or 43,560 cubic feet.
2. CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER
RIGHTS LAw, FINAL REPORT 136 (1978) [hereinafter cited as CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S FINAL REPORT]; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, GROUND
WATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA (Jan. 1980) [hereinafter cited as GROUND WATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA]
3. Saltwater intrusion has been identified all along the California coast, from
San Diego to Humboldt counties. In 1975, the California Department of Water Resources identified fourteen known areas and fourteen suspected areas of saltwater
intrusion in the state. The known areas are: Eel River Valley, Petaluma Valley,
Napa-Sonoma Valley, Santa Clara Valley, Pajaro Valley, Elkhorn Slough Area, Salinas Valley Pressure Area, Morro Basin, Chorro Basin, Los Osos Basin, Oxnard Plain
Basin, West Coast Basin (Los Angeles County), and San Luis Rey Valley-Mission
Basin. The suspected areas are: Russian River Basin, Drakes Estero Basin, Bolinas
Lagoon Basin, Frank Creek Basin, Richardson Bay Basin, Ross Valley Basin, San
Rafael Basin, Suisum-Fairfield Valley, Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, Tonitas
Creek Basin, Carmel Valley, Big Sur River Basin, Santa Rosa Creek Basin, and San
Diego River-Mission Valley Basin. See CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, BULL. No. 63-5, SEA-WATER INTRUSION IN CALIFORNIA 2, 3 (Oct. 1975).
4. Land subsidence in California has occurred primarily in the San Joaquin
Valley in the basins subject to critical conditions of overdraft as described above. In
this area land subsidence of up to twenty-eight feet has been measured although the
amount of subsidence measured is more likely to be between two to five feet. Additional areas of subsidence in California include the San Jose area in the Santa Clara
Valley, parts of northern Los Angeles County, and central Orange County. See
GROUND WATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA, .stupra note 2, at 46-47; CALIFORNIA GoVERNOR'S FINAL REPORT, supra note

2, at 141;

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER

RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA GROUND WATER, BULL. No. 118, 119 (Sept. 1975) [herein-

after cited

as CALIFORNIA GROUND WATER]; CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF WATER
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of the land's surface-sometimes causing damage to surface structures), and ultimately, the complete depletion of the resource.
In 1980, statewide overdrafting in California was estimated at
somewhere between 2.0 and 2.5 million acre-feet a year with approximately 1.5 million acre-feet of that amount occurring in the
San Joaquin Valley.5 Thus, as of October, 1981, the California
Department of Water Resources identified eleven groundwater
basins as "subject to critical conditions of overdraft. ' 6 In many
other parts of California, however, groundwater supplies are well
managed to prevent overdrafting. Such management has either
been through the creation of local water districts or through adju-7
dication and management by a court-appointed watermaster.
Unfortunately, in those parts of the state, notably where the
eleven basins are subject to "critical conditions of overdraft,"
management to prevent overdraft has often been impossible under
the current groundwater law.8
On November 2, 1982, California voters were provided with the
opportunity to modify California groundwater law in a way that
would have substantially curtailed overdrafting in the state's
eleven groundwater basins subject to critical overdraft conditions.
However, the voters defeated Proposition 13, known as the Water
Resources Conservation and Efficiency Act by a vote margin of
sixty-five to thirty-five percent (65-35%).9
This Article will summarize the current state of California's
groundwater law and the reasons why those familiar with the
present status feel it provides inadequate protection of groundwater basins from overdrafting. In addition, the Water Resources
Conservation and Efficiency Act will be summarized and anaRESOURCES, ANALYSIS OF AQUIFER-SYSTEM COMPACTION IN THE ORANGE COUNTY

GROUND WATER BASIN (June 1980).
5. CALIFORNIA WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD AND THE DEPARTMENT
OF WATER RESOURCES, POLICIES AND GOALS FOR CALIFORNIA WATER MANAGE-

MENT, 2 (June 1980).
6. GROUND WATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA,

supra note 2, at 3. Those basins

are: Santa Cruz-Pajaro, Cuyama Valley, Ventura County, Eastern San Joaquin,
Chowchilla, Madera, Kings, Kaweah, Tulare Lake, Tule, and Kern County. All, save
the first three, are located in the central valley. The Department's determination was
as follows: "A basin is subject to critical conditions of overdraft when continuation of
present water management practices would probably result in significant, adverse
overdraft-related environmental, social, or economic impacts." Id.
7. Id.
8. As former California Department of Water Resources director, Ronald R.
Robie, explained, "(t)he solutions supplied thus far by the courts have been useful in
solving specific problems, but I am convinced that the full range of ground water
problems in California cannot be solved under existing legal doctrines." R. Robie,
Ground Water-A Perspectivein PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE ON GROUND WATER, 155 (1981).
9. Brazil, A Mixed Bag ofMessages From Those Ballot Propositions,13 CAL. J.
442 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Brazil].
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lyzed as to why the initiative failed and what obstacles need to be
overcome before further attempts are made to curtail overdrafting
in California.
I.

CALIFORNIA GROUNDWATER LAW

Groundwater in California is divided into three classes: 1) the
underflow of surface streams, 2) definite underground streams,
and 3) percolating waters. Since the underflow of surface streams
and underground streams are governed by the laws of surface
water, only the law governing percolating waters are included in
the following analysis.
A.

The CorrelativeRights Doctrine

Prior to 1903, California courts followed the English common
law rule of absolute ownership.' 0 Thus, the California Supreme
Court originally held that extractions of water on ones own land
which interfered with extractions on adjacent lands were not actionable." Basically, the court based its holding on the premise
that percolating waters are part of the land and accordingly belong to the owners of that property.
In 1903, however, the California Supreme Court in the
landmark case, Katz v. Walkinshaw,' 2 rejected the absolute ownership doctrine and found that reasonable use should govern the
rights of overlying landowners. The court found that reasonable
use "limits the right of others to such amount of water as may be
purpose in connection with the land
necessary for some useful
13
from which it is taken."'
In dicta, the Katz court also outlined what it called the "rule of
correlative rights."' 14 Taken together, the rule of correlative rights
and the requirement of reasonable and beneficial use provide that
landowners overlying a common source of percolating groundwater have equal or correlative rights to a reasonable amount of
the water when applied to a reasonable and beneficial use on the
land overlying the groundwater basin.
Cases subsequent to Katz have clarified its dicta and affirmed
the correlative rights doctrine. In 1928, through the initiative pro10. Vineland Irrigation Dist. v. Azusa Irrigating Co., 126 Cal. 486, 58 P. 1057
(1899).
11. Id.

12. 141 Cal. 116, 74 P. 766 (1903).
13. Id. at 134, 74 P. at 771.
14. Id. at 135-36, 74 P. at 772. As the court explained, "Disputes between overlying landowners, concerning water for use on the land, to which they have an equal
right, in cases where the supply is insufficient for all, are to be settled by giving each a
fair and just propation." Id.
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cess, a reasonable and beneficial use requirement was added to
the California Constitution.' 5 Subsequently in 1935, although initially a response to its decision dealing with surface water rights,16
the California Supreme Court found the amendment also applied
to groundwater.' 7 Thus, under the correlative rights doctrine, priority in time does not give rise to priority in right. Furthermore,
in Burr v. MaclayRancho Water Co. ,I8 the court held that overlying landowners had equal rights regardless of the fact that the defendant had not exercised his right.
Finally, in the event the underground supply is inadequate to
satisfy the needs of overlying landowners, each owner is entitled
to a reasonable share of the supply. 19 The courts may therefore
determine the reasonableness of extractions for each entitled party
in such cases,
and restrict overlying landowners to their reason20
able share.
B. Non-Overing Use
When there is a surplus of percolating groundwater, that surplus may be extracted for use on distant lands. 21 Such extractions
are subject to the doctrine of prior appropriation, and the rights so
acquired are inferior to the rights of overlying landowners using
the water on overlying lands. 22 In the event an overlying landowner has not exercised his right, he may protect and preserve his
rights against extractions of a surplus appropriator by seeking a
declaratory judgment. 23 An overlying use includes use on land
within a given groundwater basin or watershed and is not limited
24
to use on the particular parcel where the pumping is occurring.
15. CAL. CONST. art. 10, § 2 (West Supp. 1984) (originally art. 14, § 3, amended
1974); See M. ARCHIBALD, CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, APPROPRIATIVE WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA

(1977).
16. Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607
(1926).
17. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935).
18. 160 Cal. 268, 116 P. 715 (1911).
19. Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949); Cohen v. La Canada Land & Water Co., 142 Cal. 437, 76 P. 47 (1904).
20. San Bernardino v. Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 198 P. 784 (1921).
21. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 277-78, 537 P.2d
1250, 1307, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 58 (1975).
22. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 135, 74 P. 766, 772 (1903); City of Los
Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 293, 537 P.2d 1250, 1318, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 69 (1975).
23. Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co., 154 Cal. 428, 436, 98 P. 260, 264 (1908).
24. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 925, 207 P.2d 17, 28
(1949).
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C. Prescrition

"[Ain appropriative taking of water which is not surplus is
wrongful and may ripen into a prescriptive right where the use is
actual, open and notorious, hostile and adverse to the original
owner, continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period of
five years, and under claim of right."'-5
For a prescriptive right to ripen, the appropriation must be during a period of overdraft. 26 Therefore, if at any time during the
five years of the adverse use there exists a surplus, the appropriation is not wrongful and the statutory period does not run.27 In
addition, the owner of the original right must be on notice that an
overdraft exists. The assertion that the original owner's rights are
being invaded or the mere lowering of the water levels during the
period of wrongful appropriation are not, in themselves, adequate
notice. 28

In any event, the rights of overlying owners, surplus appropriators, and rights acquired through a prior prescription, may be lost
through prescription. During an overdraft, parties can protect
themselves from rights acquired by prescription through injunctive relief.29 Also, by continuing to pump during the prescriptive

period, those private parties with prior rights 30will retain their proportionate share of the safe yield in a basin.
D.

Physical Solutions

At times the strict application of water rights in a case will result in waste. For example, when a senior right holder is entitled
to an injunction against a junior right holder the result will be a
reduction in the total amount of water available to both parties.
In such cases California courts have fashioned "physical
solutions.",31
In City ofLodi v. East Bay Municipal Utility District32 the California Supreme Court interpreted article 14, section 3 of the California Constitution 33 as giving the courts an affirmative duty "to
ascertain whether there exists a physical solution of the problem
25. Id. at 926-27, 207 P.2d at 29.
26. See id. at 925-26, 207 P.2d at 28-29.
27. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 284, 537 P.2d
1250, 1312, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 63 (1975).
28. Id. at 282, 537 P.2d at 1311, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
29. Id. at 278, 537 P.2d at 1307, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
30. Id. at 293, 537 P.2d at 1318, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
31. A. SCHNEIDER, CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMMISION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, GROUND WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA (1977) [hereinafter cited as GROUND WATER RIGHTS].

32. 7 Cal. 2d 316, 60 P.2d 439 (1936).
33. The 1928 Constitutional Amendment now article 10, section 2 of the Califor-
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presented that will avoid the waste, and that will at the same time

not unreasonably and'34adversely affect the prior appropriator's
vested property right."

In any dispute involving the water fights of parties, the courts
may fashion a practical physical solution designed to prevent
waste, while protecting superior rights. From 1903 until 1949
courts applied the correlative rights doctrine and often sought

physical solutions that would avoid waste. 35 During this period it
became apparent that merely establishing and upholding the

rights among parties did not protect groundwater basins from being overdrafted. As one commentator noted:
[T]he court would enjoin pumping only if and when withdrawals directly interfered with pumping activities of other producers who were prior in right.
By the mid 1930's, it became apparent that steps had to be
taken in order to control the total amount of water pumped
from the ground water basins of Southern California. The hit
and miss tactics of individually orientated adjudications of
ground water rights were not effective in coping with the tremendous disparity between ground water supplies and demands. To remedy this situation, it was again necessary for the
36
Supreme Court to revise the ground water laws of this state.

Such revision came in the form of the "mutual prescription doc-

37
trine" promulgated in City of Pasadena v. City of A/hambra.

Pasadenainvolved pumpers in the Raymond basin in Southern
California. For twenty-two of the twenty-four years prior to filing
the suit, the Raymond basin had been in a condition of overdraft.

The court found that the appropriators who caused the overdraft
were not only invading the rights of overlying owners and prior
appropriators but that such appropriators, had effectively acquired prescriptive rights. Although leaving open the question of

whether overlying owners had obtained new prescriptive rights,
nia Constitution requires the beneficial use of water and prohibiting waste. CAL.
CON ST. art. 10 § 2 (West Supp. 1984).
34. City of Lodi v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 7 Cal. 2d 316, 339, 60 P.2d 439, 450
(1936).
35. GROUND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 31, at 19.
36. Reis, Legal PlanningFor Ground Water Production, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 484,
487 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Reis].
37. 33 Cal. 2d. 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949). Most commentators have seen Pasadena
as adopting the mutual prescription doctrine in California. See, e.g., Reis, supra note
36, at 488; GROUND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 31, at 19. For a contrary view see W.
HUTCHINS, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE WATER RIGHTS LAW IN THE NINETEEN

WESTERN STATES, VOL. II 677-78 (1974) [hereinafter cited as HUTCHINS]. Hutchins
notes that the Pasadenacourt did not use the term mutual prescription and argues
instead that the court decided the case, "on the basis of the concept of prescriptive
rights in the classical sense and on the doctrine of correlative rights as developed in
California." Id. at 678. Regardless of whether the Pasadenacourt intended to adopt
the mutual prescription doctrine, the practical result (i.e., the remedy) was the same.
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the court found that by their continued pumping overlying owners
retained their rights to future extractions. As the Pasadena court
held:
The original owners by their own acts ... thus retained or acquired a right to continue to take some water in the future. The
wrongdoers also acquired prescriptive rights to continue to take
water, but their rights were limited to the extent that the 3origi8
nal owners retained or acquired rights by their pumping.
In upholding the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court limited total withdrawals to the safe yield of the basin and found all
acquired prescriptive rights were of equal priority. The extractions of all parties were limited to their proportion of the safe
yield based on total extractions during any five-year period
from
39
the beginning of the overdraft until the filing of the suit.
Concerning the mutual prescription doctrine and the stipulated
judgment approach after Pasadena one commentator noted:
Many adjudications. . . have followed a pattern of negotiation
to find a physical solution, stipulation for judgment, and judgment. The first step of this stipulated judgment approach generally has been to apply the mutual prescription formula to the
available pumping data. By agreeing to apply a formula, the
parties have avoided adversary proceedings in many situations
where determination of complex appropriative priorites might
in any event have
been impossible because of insufficient and
unreliable data. 40
E. Mutual PrescriptionAfter San Fernando
In 1975, the California Supreme Court decided the case of City
ofLos Angeles v. City of San Fernando4 l. The San Fernando case
had a significant impact on several aspects of California groundwater law.
In 1955, the city of Los Angeles brought suit against the cities of
San Fernando, Glendale, and Burbank, the Crescenta Valley
County Water District and various private parties. Los Angeles
sought to quiet title and obtain a declaration of its superior rights
38. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 933, 207 P.2d 17, 32
(1949).
39. The decision in the Pasadena case was based on a stipulation agreed to by all
parties in the case, save the appellant, California-Michigan Land & Water Company.
The court's decision applied to all the parties. Id. at 922, 207 P.2d at 26.
40. GROUND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 31, at 23-24 (footnotes omitted). The
author cites several cases that have followed this approach including: California
Water Service Co. v. Sidebotham & Son, Inc., 224 Cal. App. 2d 715, 37 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1964) and Tehachapi-Cummings County Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 49 Cal. App. 3d
992, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1975).
41. 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P. 2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975).
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to water underlying the upper Los Angeles River area. 42 In addi-

tion, Los Angeles sought to enjoin the defendants from making
extractions that interfered with the plaintiffs claimed, prior
43
right.
The impact of the San Fernando decision on the mutual pre-

scription doctrine was primarily threefold. First, the court upheld
the city of Los Angeles' argument that California Civil Code sec-

tion 1007, 44 prohibiting the acquisition of prescriptive rights by
any person, firm or corporation against a city, county, public utility or other public entity; prevented courts from imposing a mutual prescription formula on a city absent the city's consent.4 5

Accordingly, this placed private pumpers at a disadvantage vis-a-

vis public pumpers. Specifically, private pumpers can lose their
rights through prescription to public pumpers, but public pumpers
cannot lose their rights to either private or public pumpers
through prescription.
A second impact which the San Fernando decision had on prescription, and on available management alternatives for groundwater basins, concerned the definition of overdraft. In Pasadena
the court defined overdraft as a condition in which extractions exceeded safe yields. 46 The San Fernando court expanded this defi-

nition by interpreting safe yield to include additions and
withdrawals over an extended period of time. The court noted:
Ground basin levels tended to vary in accordance with wide
fluctuations in precipitation. Thus if a rising level of extractions were halted at the point of the safe yield based on the 29year long term average, ensuing heightening of ground water
levels during years of higher-than-average precipitation would
42. Id. at 207, 537 P.2d at 1258, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 9.
43. Id. at 207, 537 P.2d at 1259, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
44. California Civil Code section 1007 was amended in 1935 to read in pertinent
part,
no possession by any person, firm, or corporation no matter how long continued of any land, water, water right... owned by any county, city and
county, city, irrigation district, public or municipal corporation or any department or agency thereof, shall ever ripen into any title, interest or right
against such county, city and county ....
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1007 (1935) (amended 1968). In 1968 the section was amended to
read:
but no possession by any person, firm or corporation no matter how long
continued of any land, water, water right... dedicated to a public use by a
public utility, or dedicated to or owned by the state or any public entity,
shall ever ripen into any title, interest or right against the owner thereof.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1007 (West 1982). The San Fernando court found "any person,
firm or corporation" to include municipal entities. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 278,
537 P.2d at 1307, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
45. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 270, 537 P.2d at 1301, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
46. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 929, 207 P.2d 17, 30
(1949).
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cause waste.47

exThe court thus concluded that overdraft occurred only when
48
tractions exceeded safe yields plus any temporary surplus.
An essential element of prescription is that there be adversity.
In a given case, overdraft constitutes the necessary adversity. For
the prescriptive right to ripen, overdraft must continue for five
consecutive years. If, however, during any one of the five years
there is a surplus, the prescriptive period ceases to run. Consequently, the definition of overdraft articulated by the San Fernando court will make overdraft, and therefore prescription, more
difficult to establish.
The third impact San Fernando had on prescription, concerns
the element of notice. For the prescription period to run, the
holders of the original rights must be on notice that an overdraft
exists. In Pasadena the lowering of the water table was determined to be adequate notice of an overdraft. 49 Consistent with its
new definition of overdraft, the San Fernando court found that the
lowering of the water table alone was not adequate notice, and
that owners of prior rights must be on notice, infact, that there is
an overdraft. 50
Additionally, in its discussion of mutual prescription, the San
Fernando court stressed several drawbacks of the doctrine. The
court noted that determinations of prescriptive rights on the basis
of the highest level of pumping during any five-year period of the
overdraft had in the past resulted in a "race to the pumphouse
S.. each party endeavoring to increase the volume of continuous

use on which his prescriptive right will be based.

.

..

,51

In ac-

cordance therewith, after the San Fernando decision, one of the
state's leading hydrologists wrote: "More than one industry has
gone into agricultural activities on lands adjacent to its plant, and
has been granted pumping rights on the basis of both industrial
and agricultural use,52 the latter sometimes of questionable economic justification."
47. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 208, 537 P.2d at 1309, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 59 (footnotes omitted).
48. Id. at 280, 537 P.2d at 1309, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 60.
49. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 930, 207 P.2d 17, 31

(1949).
50. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 283, 537 P.2d at 1311, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 62. One
commentator observed: "It may be that, in order to establish notice after San Fernando, a pumper who wants to perfect his prescriptive rights will finance hydrodogical determinations of overdraft in a basin, and, based on that data, actually notify
other basin pumpers of the basin's overdraft." GROUND WATER RIGHTs, supra note
31, at 34.
51. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 267, 537 P.2d at 1299, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
52. Mann, The San FernandoCase-ItsImpact on Future Ground Water Manage-
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The court also questioned the equity of mutual prescription as a
solution to groundwater disputes. Although avoiding direct criticism of the Pasadenadecision, and the application of the doctrine,
given the facts in the case, the court noted that use of the doctrine
"does not necessarily result in the most equitable apportionment
apportionment
of water according to need. A true equitable
'53
would take into account many more factors.
F. Pueblo Rights
The San Fernando case also dealt extensively with the "pueblo
rights doctrine." The pueblo rights doctrine gives a right to any
city that can trace its origins to Spanish or Mexican land grants.
All Spanish or Mexican laws that existed prior to the annexation
of California are the law of the state unless expressly amended or
repealed.5 4 In addition, the United States Supreme Court has
held that pueblo rights are a question of state and not federal
law."
Since considered the "most litigated issue in the history of water
rights" 56 the courts first directed their attention to pueblo rights in
1881.57 In the litigation dealing with pueblo rights prior to 1975,
two early cases are most often cited, Lux v. Haggin,58 decided in
1884, and Vernon Irrigation Co. v. City of Los Angeles,5 9 decided
in 1895.
Interestingly, the Lux case dealt with pueblo rights in dicta, 60
and the Vernon case did not articulate any particular Spanish or
Mexican law establishing the right, but rather concluded that the
right was implied from the role assigned by the Spanish and Mexican governments to the pueblo. These and other cases on the
pueblo right led one longtime water rights commentator to observe: "[tihus this vitally important principle that has enabled
great cities to monopolize the entire flow of streams, regardless of
water developments thereon by others. . . was added to the jurisprudence of California as the result of a presumption."'6'
ment in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH BIENNIEL CONFERENCE ON GROUND WATER,
212 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Mann].
53. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 265, 537 P.2d at 1298, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 49 (footnote omitted).
54. Ohm v. City & County of San Francisco, 92 Cal. 437, 28 P. 580 (1891).
55. Los Angeles Farming & Mill Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 217 U.S. 217, 234
(1910).
56. Mann, supra note 52, at 209.
57. Feliz v. City of Los Angeles, 58 Cal. 73 (1881).
58. 69 Cal. 255, 4 P. 919 (1884).
59. 106 Cal. 237, 39 P. 762 (1895).
60. HUTCHINS, supra note 37, at 147.

61. Mann, supra note 52, at 209.
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In the San Fernando case, the trial court spent months establishing a record for the existence of a pueblo right in Spanish and
Mexican law.6 2 The lower court concluded that such a right could
not be found and ruled against Los Angeles. The supreme court
concluded that the "case for the existence of the pueblo right is
essentially based on inferences from historical circumstances
rather than on any express provision of Spanish or Mexican
law." 63 This being so, the court found that although the data
presented at trial did not conclusively establish a basis in SpanishMexican law for the right, it also did not conclusively establish its
nonexistence. Therefore, in light of the numerous cases that had
upheld the right, and considering the reliance the city of Los Angeles had made on the right in its water planning, the court chose
64
not to disturb the right.
Pueblo rights attach to all surface water serving the original
pueblo and to that native groundwater that is hydrologically related to the surface water supply. Hence, in San Fernando, the
city of Los Angeles was found to have no right to groundwater in
basins that were hydrologically independent, because of natural
65
barriers, from the basin which feeds the Los Angeles River.
Of particular importance to the nature of the pueblo water right
is its priority over other rights and the amount of water that can
be claimed under it. Pueblo rights are superior to both riparian
rights, 66 and the rights of appropriators. 67 The right is limited to
that amount necessary to satisfy the municipal needs of the city
including annexed land outside the original boundaries of the
68
pueblo. Hence, the right expands with the expansion of the city.
Finally, the right is not subject to loss by nonuse or statutory
69
forfeiture.
G. Conjunctive Use
Conjunctive use is the coordinated operation of surface water
reservoirs and underground reservoirs so that total yield over a
62. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 232, 537 P.2d
1250, 1274, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 25 (1975).
63. Id. at 232, 537 P.2d at 1275, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 26.
64. The right, however, does not attach to non-native groundwater or water that
has been imported from outside and stored within the basin. Id. at 251, 537 P.2d at
1288, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (1974).
65. Id.
66. Vernon Irrigation Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 106 Cal. 237, 39 P. 762 (1895).
67. City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal. 2d 68, 142 P.2d 289 (1943).
68. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250,
123 Cal. Rptr. 1, (1975); City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal. 2d 68, 142
P.2d 289 (1943); City of Los Angeles v. Hunter, 156 Cal. 603, 105 P. 755 (1909); City
of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 57 P. 585 (1899).
69. City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale, 23 Cal. 2d 68, 142 P.2d 289 (1943).
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period of years may exceed uncoordinated yields. Independent
operation of surface or underground reservoirs designed to produce a long term, safe, dependable yield, requires that extraction
rates roughly equal rates of replenishment. Conjunctive operation
of surface and underground reservoirs allows for the temporary
overdrafting (i.e., extractions beyond safe yield) of surface reservoirs during dry years. The additional yield resulting from conjunctive management is therefore obtained from saving water that
might otherwise be wasted during wet years from overflow and a
reduced amount of evaporation.
The San Fernando decision and an earlier case,Alameda County
Water District v. Niles Sand and Gravel Co.70 had a significant
impact on the ability of water purveyors to conjunctively manage
surface and groundwater sources. In Niles the Alameda County
Water District had been recharging the Niles Basin by percolation
for storage purposes to prevent salt water intrusion. The Niles
Sand and Gravel Company dug pits to a depth of 120 to 125 feet
below the surface elevation and 80 to 85 feet below the water table.71 To continue operations, the company was pumping and releasing roughly five-million gallons of water per day into San
Francisco Bay.72 The court found that based on the statutory
powers granted to the water district by the state, and the doctrine
of correlative rights, landowners in the Niles Basin had a public
servitude that imposed "such obligations. . limiting the use of
lands lying in a particular geographical area, where an overriding
''73 The right to enforce the servitude is
public interest requires it.
held by the district and it limits overlying landowners' rights to
groundwater when such use interferes with a public groundwater
storage program. The court found the district had a right to store
water, to prevent others from extracting the water and was not
liable for damage caused by flooding from such storage when
water levels went no higher than their natural levels, i.e., the level
absent extractions. 74
In the San Fernando case the court distinguished between native and imported groundwater, and concerning the latter, found
an importer had the right to recapture water either spread for storage or percolating back into a basin after distribution. 75 The court
70. 37 Cal. App. 3d 924, 112 Cal. Rptr. 846 (Ct. App. 1974) cert. denied, 419 U.S.
869 (1975).
71. Id. at 929, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 934, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 853 (citations omitted).
74. Id. at 935, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 854. See also GROUND WATER RioHTS supra
note 31, at 67-68.
75. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 261, 537 P.2d
1250, 1295, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1, 46 (1975).
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based this ruling on an interpretation of Water Code section 7075,
which reads: "Water which has been appropriated may be turned
into the channel of another stream, mingled with its water, and
then reclaimed; but in reclaiming it the water already appropri'76
ated by another shall not be diminished.
Citing the City of Los Angeles v. City of Glendale,77 the court
found Water Code section 7075 applicable to groundwater storage.78 In addition, the right to recapture was found to be of equal
priority with pueblo rights and superior to rights based on the
ownership of overlying land or appropriation. 79 Further, concerning the recapture of delivered water, the court stated:
The purpose of giving the right to recapture returns from delivered imported water priority over overlying rights and rights
based on appropriations of the native ground supply is to credit
the importer with the fruits of his expenditures and endeavors
in bringing into the basin water that would not otherwise be
there.80
Thus, during the periods of basin surplus, importers cannot prevent appropriators from making extractions if the importer has
81
failed to recapture the imported water.
In addition to providing greater certainty in planning for the
utilization of conjunctive use for municipal water agencies in California, the San Fernando and Niles decisions can also provide a
firm legal basis for significantly increasing the yield of the California State Water Project (SWP). The current gross surface storage capacity of the SWP is approximately thirty-nine million acre
feet. 82 Of a 143 million acre-feet of groundwater storage capacity
close enough to the surface and permeable enough to be managed
83
conjunctively, fifty-two million acre feet are empty.
II.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS IN CALIFORNIA GROUNDWATER
LAW

Article 10, Section 2 of the California Constitution states:
The right to water or to the use flow of water in or from any
natural stream or water course in this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for the bene76. Id. at 260, 537 P.2d at 1295, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 46 (citing CAL. WATER CODE
§ 7075 (West 1971)).
77. 23 Cal. 2d 68, 142 P.2d 289 (1943).
78. San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d at 260, 537 P.2d at 1295, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 46 (1975).
79. Id. at 287, 537 P.2d at 1314, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
80. Id. at 261, 537 P.2d at 1295, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
81. Id.at 293, 537 P.2d at 1318, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
82. Robie & Donovan, Water Management of the Future: A Ground Water Storage Programforthe CaliforniaState Water Project I1PAc. LAW. J., 41, 43 (1979).
83. Id.
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ficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not
extend to the waste or unreasonable use ....84
Although not specifically mentioned in the foregoing section,
the California Supreme Court has found the above provision applicable to groundwater.8 5 As discussed earlier, the reasonable,
beneficial use and avoidance of waste requirements provide broad
guidelines for the courts in adjudicating water rights.
Various sections of the water code establish a public interest in
the use and development of groundwater and additionally declare
the states inherent right to regulate groundwater for public benefit
and protection.8 6 Furthermore, section 12922 of the code states
that there is a public interest in protecting groundwater basins
from damage or impairment caused by "overdraft, depletion, sea
water intrusion or degraded water quality." 87
The manifestations of these declarations of public interest in
terms of legislation to end overdrafting, control pollution, regulate
pumping, and address other groundwater problems have been
sparse.
The water code provides for the inspection of "improperly constructed, abandoned or defective wells" by the Department of
Water Resources (DWR) either independently or in conjunction
with other governmental units. 88 The Code also authorizes the
DWR to make recommendations for well construction standards
to the Regional Water Quality Control Boards,8 9 and "from time
to time" to report to the legislature recommendations for the sealing of abandoned wells. 90
Prior to commencing any digging or deepening of a well, and
prior to the abandonment or destruction of a well, a permit must
be obtained from the DWR. 9 1 After completion of any one of
these projects, it is required that a report of completion be filed
with the DWR within thirty days. 92 Failure to obtain the necessary permit or to file the report is a misdemeanor. 93
If the DWR determines that certain standards are necessary for
the construction, maintenance, abandonment, or destruction of
wells in a given area, it makes recommendations to the appropriate regional board and to the State Department of Public
84. CAL. CONST. art. 10, § 2 (West Supp. 1984).
85. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935).
86. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 104, 105 (West 1971).

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at § 12922.
at § 231.
at § 13750.
at § 13751.
at § 13754.
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Health. 94 After receiving a recommendation from the DWR, the
regional boards are required to hold a hearing on the proposed
standards. 95 Absent a recommendation, regional boards, may
hold hearings when they have information that standards are necessary to protect water quality in a groundwater basin.96 Upon a
determination that standards are necessary, the board must report
those standards along with any standards recommended
by the
97
DWR to the county and cities within the affected area.
Upon receipt of the regional boards' recommendations, the

county or city involved must determine, within 120 days, regula-

tions establishing the recommended standards. 98 Such ordinances
take effect sixty days thereafter, unless the regional board finds
the proposed standards inadequate. 99 If found inadequate, the
county or city has ninety days to adopt new standards. If the city
or county fails to adopt or modify its standards within the time
periods outlined above, the regional board is authorized to set
standards for the area which will in turn take effect thirty days
from inception.1°°
Additionally, the State Water Resources Control Board can review the action (or inaction) of any regional board, either on its
own or at the request of a concerned city or county. Moreover,
the state board may review city or county standards in the event
regional boards have failed to do so.101
A.

Porter-Dolwig

In 1961, the legislature found that groundwater basins, are
"subject to critical conditions or overdraft, depletion, sea water
intrusion and degraded water quality causing great detriment to
02
the peace, health, safety and welfare of the people of the State." 1
The legislative response was the Porter-Dolwig Ground Water
Basin Protection Law.'0 3 Porter-Dolwig authorizes the DWR to
study or investigate projects that could protect groundwater and to
review and evaluate the plans of any local agency that submits its
groundwater protection plans to the DWR.' 4 The DWR is also
authorized to provide technical assistance to local agencies on a
94. Id. at § 13800.
95. Id. at 13801.

96. Id.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at § 13802.
Id. at § 13803.
Id. at § 13804.
Id. at § 13805.
Id. at § 13806.
Id. at § 12922.1.
Id. at §§ 12920-12925.
Id. at § 12923.
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cost sharing basis. 10 5 Any results from DWR studies are required
by law to be sent to the State Water Resources Control Board
(State Board) and the Regional Water Quality Control Boards
(Regional Boards) so that they may be used in formulating water
quality standards. 10 6 In 1967, the law was amended to provide
funding for studies "whenever money has been appropriated for
the purpose .

lO"107

If the DWR recommends to the State Board that action is necessary to protect the quality of groundwater basins, the legislature
has granted the State Board authority to bring suit in superior
court to restrict pumping or impose physical solutions. 0 8 In such
cases, all groundwater pumpers, except those extracting less than
ten acre feet a year, 0 9 shall be named as party defendants.110
B. Porter-Cologne

In 1969, the legislature passed the Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act to establish a statewide water quality control program administered on a regional basis."' The act applies to both
surface and groundwater." 12
Established within the California Resources Agency, 113 the
State Board has the responsibility, in consultation with other governmental units,

I4

of adopting state policy for water quality con-

trol.' ' Additional responsibilities include: adopting procedures
for regional boards to follow when formulating water quality control plans, 116 distributing appropriated funds to regional boards
for their administrative costs, 117 annually evaluating the need for
water quality research," 8 ' and conducting such research or coordinating research with other units of government or private
organizations. 119
The nine regional water quality control boards are responsible,
subject to state board approval, for formulating and implementing
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id. at § 12923.1.
Id. at § 12923.
Id. at § 2100.
Id. at § 2102.
Id. at § 2100.
Id. at §§ 13000-13806.
Id. at § 13050(e).
Id. at §§ 175, 13100.
Id. at § 13144.
Id. at § 13140.
Id.at § 13164.
Id. at § 13168.
Id. at § 13161.
Id. at § 13162.
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water quality control plans. 120 These plans, must, among other
things, "ensure the reasonable protection of beneficial uses and
the prevention of nuisance .... ,,121 The attorney general is authorized to enforce regional plans. 122 At the request of the regional board, the attorney general will seek a restraining order or
injunction from the superior court.123
C. Recordation Act

In 1955, the legislature found that because of a "combination of
light rainfall, concentrated population, the transition of considerable areas of land from agricultural use to urban use, and a similar
dependence on groundwater supplies ....

"-124 the counties of

Riverside, San Bernandino, Los Angeles and Ventura would be
subject to recordation
requirements for groundwater extractions
125
and diversions.

Accordingly, individuals extracting groundwater in excess of
twenty-five acre feet a year are required to fide a "Notice of Extraction and Diversion of Water" with the State Water Resources
Control Board. 126 Such notice must contain: the name of the
pumpers, the location and description of the pump site, the quantity of water pumped, and any additional facts the state board
may deem appropriate. 127 Likewise, prescriptive rights cannot be
acquired unless a notice has been filed, 128 and for legal purposes,
pumping without having filed notice is considered nonuse. 129 Finally, the wilful
misstatement of facts in a notice is a mis30
demeanor. 1

The Recordation Act has allowed for a much more precise
monitoring of extractions in the four southern counties than had
been possible in the past. The Act also makes it more difficult to
acquire rights by prescription inasmuch as prior right holders are
in a better position to know when they need to act to protect their
rights.
The various statutory measures outlined above have given the
state power to protect groundwater basins from pollution and to
generate useful information on the extent of groundwater pump120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at §§ 13200, 13201, 13225.
Id. at § 13241.
Id. at 13262.
Id.
Id. at § 4999.
Id. Santa Barbara County was excluded in 1959.
Id. at § 5001.
Id. at § 5002.
Id. at § 5003.
Id. at § 5004.
Id. at § 5008.
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ing in the southern part of the state. Although local districts can
manage groundwater basins to prevent overdraft and courts have
appointed watermasters to provide local management, some basins are without such management. Under current law, the state is
powerless to prevent additional pumping in overdrafted basins.
III.

COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS

LAW

During the 1976-77 drought in California, deliveries from
state's major surface water systems were severely curtailed and
groundwater overdrafting increased significantly. In the San Joaquin and Tulare hydrologic study areas alone, overdrafting was
close to five times the normal rate. 13 ' Throughout the state an
estimated 28,000 additional wells were drilled, deepened, or
32
repaired.

1

On May 11, 1977, California Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr.,
by executive order, created the Governor's Commission to Review
California Water Rights Law. 133 Among other things, the order
noted that the drought underscored the need to review California
water rights law and that existing law contained impediments to
the "fullest beneficial use of the state's water resources .... ,134
The order establishied a twelve-member Commission chaired by
retired Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, Donald R.
Wright. The Commission's mandate was to "review existing California water rights law, . . . evaluate proposals for modification
in this law and. . . recommend appropriate Legislation ... ."to
35

the governor.
The Commission concentrated on six topics for intensive review. 136 Although most of these topics are not directly related to
groundwater rights, one of the Commission's members has observed that "[flrom the outset,
groundwater was the major issue
37
before the Commission."
In the context of groundwater, the Commission was primarily
concerned with developing a means of managing heretofore unmanaged groundwater basins to prevent overdrafting and related
131. CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 138.
132. CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR's FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 138.
133. Id.

134. Id. at 2.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 3. These topics were as follows: appropriative water rights, groundwater rights, legal aspects of water conservation, riparian water rights, transfer of
water rights, and legal aspects of instream uses.

137. Littleworth, New Legislationin Californiaandlts Effects, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE THIRTEENTH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE ON GROUND WATER, 46 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Littleworth].
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problems. In light of what the Commission considered adequate
groundwater management in certain local areas (either through
adjudication or local districts as discussed above), the Commission recommended statutory groundwater management only in areas not currently managed on a safe-yield basis. Such local
taking into account both
management areas would be established
138
political boundaries and hydrology.
It was further recommended that local management units
should have powers similar to those exercised by many existing
water districts and court-appointed watermasters, including the
authority to "levy pump taxes, collect data, require meters, regulate underground storage of water, regulate exports, issue licenses
for new wells, and limit pumping where necessary."' 39 The Commission also recommended that the State Water Resources Control Board have authority to evaluate and approve local
management programs and to seek judicial relief through the attorney general in the event local programs failed to meet broad,
state-management objectives.' 40
The Commission made a number of additional recommendations designed to streamline and improve adjudication procedures
in groundwater suits. For the most part, these changes were nonsubstantive and noncontroversial. 1 4 ' In an effort to temper the
San Fernando finding that private pumpers could not gain prescriptive rights against public pumpers where as public pumpers
could gain such rights against private pumpers, the Commission
recommended that preliminary injunctions be authorized in overdrafted basins and that groundwater rights, including public
rights, be allocated primarily on the basis of recent use.142 In the
area of conjunctive use and groundwater storage, the Commission
Fernando
recommended the codification of those parts of the 4San
3
and Niles decisions which relate to storage rights. '
From 1978 to 1981, numerous bills were introduced to implement the various recommendations of the Commission. Three
bills, Senate Bill 1505, Assembly Bill 442 and Assembly Bill 835,
incorporated most of the major Commission recommendations.
Senate Bill 1505 was gutted to require only that the DWR identify
groundwater basins in the state and further identify those subject
to critical conditions of overdraft. 144 Assembly Bill 442 and As138. CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S FINAL REPORT, supra note 2.

139. Littleworth, supra note 137.
140. Id., see also CALIFORNIA GovERNoR's FINAL REPORT, supra note 2.
141. Id.
142. CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 237.
143. Id.
144. Littleworth, supra note 137, at 46-47.
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sembly Bill 835, after being heavily amended and having portions
relating to groundwater
management deleted, nevertheless died in
45
committee.1
In total, nine measures were introduced from 1978 to 1981 and,
with minor exceptions, all failed. 146 Such defeats were attributable in large part to the California Legislature's failure to respond
favorably to the groundwater recommendations made by the
Commission and various interest groups and individuals. Many
of these groups were associated with the environmental movement
and organized as the California Water Resources Protection
"The Water
Council to qualify for a vote-Proposition 13 entitled
147
Resources Conservation and Efficiency Act."'
The groups and interests in active opposition to Proposition 13
were the same as those against the various bills that would have
implemented the groundwater management recommendations of
the Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights
Law. 148 This is not surprising given the similarities between the
Commission's recommendations and those parts of Proposition 13
relating to groundwater management. The provisions of the
Water Resources Conservation and Efficiency Act are summarized below, followed by an analysis of why the initiative was defeated, and issues (and concerns of interests) that will need to be
addressed before meaningful groundwater reforms to prevent
overdrafting are approved in California.
IV.

WATER RESOURCES CONSERVATION AND EFFICIENCY ACT

(THE ACT)

14 9

The Water Resources initiative contained four principal provisions. They dealt with interbasin water transfers, instream appropriations, the Stanislaus River and New Melones Dam, and
groundwater management. These provisions will be summarized
below with particular emphasis on portions of the initiative dealing with groundwater management.
A.

Interbasin Water Transfers

"Interbasin transfer" was defined as "the transfer of water for
use in a basin other than the basin in which the source of the
145. Id.
146. Littleworth, supra note 137, at 48.
147. L.A. Times, Sept. 13, 1982, at 1, col. 1.
148. Id.
149. Water Resources Conservation & Efficiency Act, Proposition 13 (rejected by
voters Nov. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Water Act] [copy on file in the offices of
California Western Law Review].
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water is located."' 50 The Act required that any such interbasin
transfer by a "supplier of, or contractor with the state or federal
government for, more than 20,000 acre-feet of water per year"
prepare and submit to the Water Resources Control Board a
"water conservation program" on or before January 1, 1985.15'
Conservation programs were required to identify all reasonable
water supply alternatives, including conservation, waste water reclamation, conjunctive use, pricing and rate structures that result in
water conservation, inter and intrabasin 52transfers, and in-basin
conventional water supply development.
Water conservation programs were further required to contain
cost comparisons of the alternatives to importation listed above,
and where a water conservation program or a portion of a conservation program "will cost less on a marginal-cost basis than importation of additional supplies, the program or portion thereof,
shall be implemented prior to commencing additional importation
projects. Implementation of alternatives shall thus include adop153
tion of all necessary ordinances or regulations."'
This last provision effectively mandated conservation and the
development of alternate water resources when such sources could
be developed at a cost below the cost of importation.
B.

Instream Appropriation

This section of the Act was designed to protect instream uses
from harm resulting from future water appropriations and to allow for appropriation of water for such uses. Instream uses included "fishery and water-related wildlife uses and recreational,
aesthetic, scientific, scenic, and water quality uses. ...
C. StanislausRiver
This section of the Act prohibited the impoundment of water
behind the New Melones Dam until "long-term water service contracts for specific municipal, industrial, or agricultural uses representing at least 75 percent of the firm yield. . ."55 were entered
into by project operators. Firm yield was to be determined by the
56
Water Resources Control Board.
The Act further directed the Water Resources Control Board to
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at § 15101(b).
Id. at § 15102.
Id. at § 15104.
Id.
Id. at § 15201.
Id. at § 15225.
Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol20/iss2/3

22

Smith: Rewriting California Groundwater Law: Past Attempts and Prerequis
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

restrict storage of water within New Melones, to the extent possible, consistent with the terms of the chapter, "to the area downstream 57of Parrott's Ferry Bridge, 808 feet above mean sea
level."'

D. GroundwaterManagement andApplicability
As noted above, in many ways the groundwater management
recommendations contained in the Act were similar to the recommendations of the Governor's Commission Review California
Water Rights Law.15 8 As to practical implementation the groundwater management provisions of the Act apply to those groundwater basins in the state identified by the California Department
of Water Resources as being subject to critical conditions of overdraft. 159 Those basins are the Santa Cruz-Pajaro Basin; the
Cuyama Valley Basin; the Ventura County Basin; the Eastern San
Joaquin County Basin; the Chowchilla Basin; the Madera Basin;
the Kings Basin; the Kaweah Basin; the Tulare Lake Basin; the
Tule Basin; and the Kern County Basin. 160 All of these basins,
excepting the first three are located in California's central valley.
iE.Management Authority
The Act directed local entities within the groundwater basins
subject to critical conditions of overdraft to nominate, within one
year of the effective date of the Act, a local authority to carry out
the provisions of the Act.161 In the event such a nomination was
contested by a local entity within sixty days or no nomination was
made, the board was directed to determine if such an authority
existed and, if so, to designate that entity as the local groundwater
management authority for the area. 162 In the event the board determined no such authoritiy existed, local entities had 180 days
after receiving notice of such a determination to create a jointpowers authority to carry out groundwater management and, to
be officially
designated the local management authority by the
board. 163
Local groundwater management authorities designated by the
157. Id. at § 15229.
158. See CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 170-255.

159. Water Act, supra note 149, at § 15320.
160. GROUND WATER BASINS IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 2, at 3.

161. Water Act, supra note 149, at § 15330. The Act instructs local entities to
nominate one of the following: "(a) a local entity which is a public agency; (b) a joint

powers authority organized under Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 6500) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code; or (c) a ground water management district organized pursuant to law, if and when such a law is enacted." Id. at § 15331.
162. Id. at §15332.
163. Id. at § 15333.
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board pursuant to the Act would have been able to exercise any of
the powers contained in the Orange County Water District Act, 164
the Sierra Valley Groundwater Basin Act, 165 or in future legislation expanding the management powers of groundwater management authorities in California. As the Act further stipulated:
any such authority shall have the power to limit, control, or
prohibit extraction of groundwater within the groundwater
management area to respond to conditions of long-term overdraft, subsidence, water quality degradation, significant environmental harm,
well interference, or the threat of any of those
66
conditions.'
F

Management Programs

Within two years of designation by the board of a groundwater
management authority within a management area, the local authority was required to adopt and submit to the board a groundwater management program. 67 Management programs were to
include four objectives 168 and a 170
plan for implementing those
objectives.' 69 The objectives were:
(1) Reduction of water demand by means of water
conservation, waste water reclamation, and
other means;
(2) Preservation and improvement of water quality
by means of soil and drainage management;
(3) Effective use of the storage capacity of the
groundwater basins; and
(4) Maintenance of groundwater supplies to provide water for
wetlands. Once established, groundwater management programs
could have been revised
as long as they were consistent with the
71
above objectives.'
One year after the effective date of the Act 172 and until the
board had approved a management plan for an area, 173 the Act
stipulated that no land within a critical groundwater overdraft
area was to be irrigated unless the land had been irrigated for at
least one growing season during the immediately preceding three
164. CAL. WATER UNCOD. AcTs, Act 5683.
165. CAL. WATER UNCOD. AcTs, Act 7662.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Water Act, supra note 149, at § 15334.
Id. at § 15340.
Id. at § 15341(a).
Id. at § 15342.
Id. at § 15341.
Id. at § 15343.
Id. at § 15350.
Id. at § 15351.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol20/iss2/3

24

Smith: Rewriting California Groundwater Law: Past Attempts and Prerequis
CALIFORNIA WESTERAN LW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

calendar years. 174 Nevertheless, the board was empowered to
grant variances to this provisions where it could be shown the irrigation75would not increase net water use within an overdrafted
area. 1
The Act directed the board not to approve any inter-basin
transfers to critical groundwater areas until basin management
and implementation plans had been approved. 176 Additionally,

wells producing less than seventy-five gallons 177
of water per minute
were not subject to the provisions of the Act.
G. Enforcement

The Act directed the board to take whatever action necessary
before executive, legislative, or judicial agencies to carry out the
provisions of the Act. 178 In fact, within sixty days of final board
action, any individual could, pursuant to the Act, file a petition
for a writ of mandate with the Sacramento County Superior
Court. Failure to file within the appropriate time, however, precluded further challenges to79the board's actions in any judicial or
administrative proceeding. 1
V. FAILURE TO ENACT A POLICY
Given the similarity of the groundwater management provisions of Proposition 13 and the groundwater management recommendations of the Governor's Commission to Review California
Water Rights Law and the failure of each to win approval of the
voters and the California Legislature respectively, an analysis of
the reasons these measures have been unsuccessful and the interests that have worked against groundwater management to prevent overdraft seems timely. Such analysis follows with
considerations that may need to be taken into account by public
policymakers for any future groundwater management proposals
that are to have a chance of success in California.
A.

The Actors

To help in understanding the political environment which pro174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at §
at §
at §
at §
at §

15350.
15351.
15352.
15370.
15401.

179. The intiative stipulated that any individual would have standing to sue for
declaratory or injunctive relief, and that the board could request the California Attorney General to "seek injunctive relief and other appropriate judicial remedies. . ." in
Sacramento County Superior Court to enforce the provision of the Act. Id. at

§ 15402.
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hibited enactment of groundwater law reforms designed specifically to curtail overdrafting in California, an examination of the
interests and interest group actors in the state active on groundwater matters and the influence such entities have on the policymaking process is required. The groups evaluated were the
California Farm Bureau, the Association of California Water
Agencies, the California Chamber of Commerce, the California
Cattlemen's Association, the Sierra Club, and the Planning and
Conservation League.' 80
Although their reasons vary, the Farm Bureau, Association of
California Water Agencies, Chamber of Commerce, and the Cattlemen's Association (hereinafter referred to as agriculture/local
option groups) all agreed on the non-desirability of any changes
in California groundwater law that would limit local control and
management of groundwater basins. Although not opposed to local control, the Sierra Club and the Planning and Conservation
League leaders interviewed (hereinafter referred to as the environmental groups), felt local control had not, given exisiting groundwater law, allowed for curtailment of overdrafting in many areas.
Rather, they favored some constraints on local options. Both the
Sierra Club and the Planning and Conservation League representatives cited Proposition 13 as the desired approach. Furthermore,
and consistent with their positions, the agricultural/local option
groups opposed Propostion 13 and the various recommendations
of the Governor's Commission pertaining to groundwater management, and the environmental groups supported these
measures.
That the agricultural groups have been successful in the battles
over groundwater management in both the legislature and the November 1982 election is not surprising upon examining the resources these groups have at their disposal vis-a-vis the
environmental groups. A summary of those resources follows
along with a brief explanation of the utility of the resources for
influencing the policymaking process.
Two group resources that are very useful for influencing the
legislative process are a group's membership base, or size, and the
180. Interest group leaders were identified on the basis of interviews with employees of the California Department of Water Resources active in the California Legislature on groundwater matters. In addition, during the interviews with the interest
group leaders so identified, the leaders themselves were asked to identify other groups
active in groundwater matters on the state level.
As part of the research undertaken for the preparation of this Article, interest group
leaders active in groundwater matters in California were identified and interviews
conducted with these leaders to determine: a) what their positions were on ground
water management to prevent overdraft, and why they held these positions; and b)
what political resources these groups had to influence the policymaking process.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol20/iss2/3

26

Smith: Rewriting California Groundwater Law: Past Attempts and Prerequis
C4LIFORNIA4 WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

ability to make campaign contributions. The utility of these group
resources for influencing the legislative process lies in the fact that
legislators find them useful for helping them realize one of their
highest goals-reelection.' 8 ' As Beatty, Doerksen and Pierce observed in their study of interest groups in Washington state, "legislators will be responsive to the demands of groups which can
in the form of votes, financial
deliver electoral support-whether
82
support or other resources."'
In initiative campaigns, particularly in California, money is an
important political resource. In statewide elections in California
television plays a very important role, often being the only contact
voters have with candidates or issues.18 3 Television is expensive,
and the candidate or group without the resources to effectively use
television to communicate with voters is at a serious disadvantage
in statewide elections.' 8 4 Thus comparing the resources of the agricultural/local option groups with the environmental groups active in California groundwater matters, it is quickly apparent that
there is wide a variation in the resources available to each group.
Among the agricultural/local option groups, all save one, the
Association of California Water Agencies, are active and heavy
contributors to political campaigns. The California Cattlemen's
Association and California Farm Bureau were frequent contributors to political campaigns. The Cattlemen's Association (through
Cattle-PAC) averaged between $1,000 to $2,500 with much of the
money going to legislative leadership. 8 5 Farm Bureau contributions ranged from $1,000 to $5,000 to a wide variety of legislative
races. 18 6 In addition, many individual farmers and farm corporations were found to be active contributors. Although the California Chamber of Commerce committees campaign for or against
ballot measures and initiatives, Chamber members including most
of the state's major corporations, are active campaign contributors. In contrast, the environmental groups make few or no mone187
tary contributions to political campaigns in California.
There are also significant differences between the agricul181. For a discussion of the importance of reelection to legislators, see D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).

182. Beatty, Doerksen, & Pierce, Water Resources Politicsand Interest Group Tactics, 14 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 399 (April 1978).
183. See M. LEARY, PHANTOM POLITICS: CAMPAIGNING IN CALIFORNIA (1977).

184. See,.e.g., E. Lee & H. Dunning, PoliticalDynamics and Decision Making, in
CALIFORNIA WATER 186 (E. Engelbert, 1982).

185. This information was obtained upon examination of campaign spending reports on file in the office of the California Secretary of State.
186. Id.
187. The California Sierra Club reported, as of May 1982, making one $1,000
legislative contribution. The Planning and Conservation League had none.
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tural/local option groups and the environmental groups in terms
of membership size and composition. Of the environmental
groups, the Planning and Conservation League has approximately
1,500 largely professional members concentrated in urban areas.
The Sierra Club has roughly 150,000 members in California also
concentrated in urban areas."' Hence, in sheer voting power the
environmental organization are not strong and that legislative influence which exists by virtue of membership is concentrated in
urban areas.
In contrast, the California Chamber of Commerce membership
includes over 4,000 firms and corporations, 385 local chambers of
commerce and 150 trade associations representing businesses
throughout the state.18 9 The California Farm Bureau has 95,000
individual members and 54 county farm bureaus throughout the
state, although individual members are obviously concentrated in
rural areas.' 90 The Association of California Water Agencies is a
federation of 285 local public water suppliers including all the major water districts in the state. 191 Hence, although in numbers the
Water Association membership is not large, their influence and
input on water matters is great. The California Cattlemen's Association is a relatively small organization, roughly 4,000 members
whose numbers are concentrated in rural areas in the northern
part of the state. 192
Perhaps even more important than the actual membership and
political contributions of the agricultural/local option groups is
the nature of the interests they represent and the importance of
those interests to the state's economy. Water Association members distribute between 85 and 90 percent of the surface water in
California. 193 Agriculture in California is big business. California produces one-fourth of the nation's food supply and farm
marketings are in excess of eight billion dollars. 194 Finally, the
Chamber of Commerce represents thousands of businesses of
every size throughout the state. Therefore, in addition to the direct support the above groups can provide to legislators, the
groups also have influence by virtue of the importance to the
state's economy of their activities.
That the above attributes contribute to the legislative influence
of the agricultural/local option groups was evident during inter188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

J. CULVER & J. SYER, POWER AND POLITICS IN CALIFORNIA 7 (1980).
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views conducted with interest group leaders. 195 When asked to
choose among having their differences with other groups settled in
the courts, the legislature, or by the bureaucracy, all of the agricultural/local option group leaders interviewed said they would
choose the legislature. Basically all gave the same explanationthey would have more influence in the legislative branch by virtue
of the resources the group enjoyed for influencing legislative
196
policymaking.
Representatives of the environmental organizations interviewed
said that given a choice they would prefer using the courts over
the legislature or bureaucracy. Again, the explanations referred to
the lack of resources necessary for working with the legislature. 197
As discussed previously, an important resource for influencing
the initiative process in California is money for purchasing television time. Here, environmental organizations (i.e., Proposition 13
proponents) were at a serious disadvantage. Whereas, the proponents of Proposition 13 spent approximately $650,000 during the
campaign, and much of that was spent to qualify the initiative, the
opponents spent approximately 1.8 million dollars, not a great
deal by California initiative standards, but it did allow for a superior television campaign. 198
The policymaking process is too complex to simply equate certain group resources with success at some type of policy influence.
The foregoing summary of the resources of groups active in California groundwater matters does not "explain" why the environmental groups have been unsuccessful in changing California
groundwater law while the agricultural/local option groups have
been successful at maintaining the status quo. Most political observers would agree, however, that certain group resources are
beneficial for influencing the policymaking process and that
groups lacking those resources are at a disadvantage as compared
with groups that possess those resources. From the foregoing
summary of group resources it seems clear that the environmental
groups studied are at a serious disadvantage vis-a-vis the agricul195. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
196. Group leaders rarely spoke in terms of resources per se, rather they referred
to aparticular resource as being beneficial for working with the legislature. For example, spokespersons for the Chamber of Commerce and Cattlemen's Association
referred to the distribution of membership, and the ability of the group to mobilize
membership to apply pressure on legislators as a reason why working with the legislature was preferable. Others referred to the fact many of the groups' members were
active campaign contributors.
197. Representatives of both environmental organizations mentioned the lack of
campaign contributions as a problem.
198. See Brazil, supra note 9. For a discussion of the ads developed by both sides
see L. A. Times, October 5, 1982, at col. 1; L.A. Times October 27, 1982, at col. 23.
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tural/local option groups when attempting to influence public
policy.
B.

Those Benefited by the Status Quo

What follows is an analysis of how and why some groups or
interests are advantaged by the status quo, why previous attempts
to rewrite California groundwater law threaten those interests,
and what future groundwater law reform proposals may need to
contain to satisfy those interests.
Since California groundwater law has largely been case law, interest groups possessing the resources to work within the judicial
system are obviously at an advantage over groups lacking those
resources. Necessary resources for using the courts to protect or
enforce groundwater rights include money1 99 and standing. 2°°
The problem is particularly acute in groundwater matters because
prior to forcing the adjudication of a groundwater basin, environmental organizations may be forced to purchase rights within the
basin. In other words, under the status quo, agricultural groundwater pumpers are in a much better position to protect their rights
vis-a-vis those that would have the courts adjudicate those rights
and impose a management plan designed to prevent overdrafting.
A group of agricultural economists at the University of California at Davis have suggested five reasons farmers oppose groundwater management. 201 First, farmers in many areas not being
overdrafted don't want groundwater regulation because they feel
it unnecessary. Second, the real costs of overutilization of groundwater basins may be mitigated or hidden by other cost and price
trends. Third, farmers fear that groundwater regulation could
shift control over allocation of the resources to non-farmers,
thereby increasing the likelihood that some agricultural use will
be lost to municipal, industrial, and other users. Fourth, farmers
fear regulation will necessitate cutbacks in irrigated acreage, resulting in reduced profits and reduced land values. Not to mention a loss on investments. And finally, many farmers feel that
prior to reaching groundwater levels at which farming is unprofitable, new surface water supplies will be made available to offset
the overdraft.
199. Good water attorneys are not cheap and these cases are notorious for the time
they take to settle. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537
P.2d 1250, 123 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1975) was in the courts twenty-four years prior to
resolution.
200. Standing has often been a problem for environmental organizations in the
past. See e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
201. Gardner, Howitt & Nuckton, The Casefor Regional Ground Water Management, 35 CAL. AGmCULTURE, 1, 2, 9-10 (1981).
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The problem with current California groundwater law according to many water specialists 202 is that absent adjudication or
water district management, farmers have an incentive to continue
and/or expand groundwater pumping. Incentives for continued
and/or expanded pumping are provided by both the court decisions establishing prescriptive rights203 and by the fact that under
current law, groundwater in California is a "common pool" resource. Absent adjudication or water district groundwater management, groundwater is common property. By not utilizing the
water for use at some future date, one is running the risk that
some other extractor will take the water. Furthermore, farmers
have not for the most part been harmed by the existing system of
groundwater rights.
Given the lack of conventional political resources necessary to
influence the policymaking process by those who have been most
active in attempting to change California groundwater law in
comparison to the political strength of those interests desiring to
maintain the status quo, political analysts may speculate whether
changes will be made to permit the control of groundwater
overdrafting.
Given the concerns of farmers and their general satisfaction
with current groundwater law, it seems at least three things should
be taken into consideration by anyone attempting to change
groundwater law to prevent overdrafting in the future.
First, state level control should be kept to a minimum. The agricultural/local option groups have made it clear both during interviews and throughout the Proposition 13 campaign that they
want to maintain local control. Whenever possible the decisions
concerning where or when and how much to pump should be
made by the local farmers themselves. Decisions about types of
conservation measures, if any, should also be made on the local
level. Proposition 13, by mandating conservation measures and
requiring that local management plans be approved by the Water
Resources Control Board, sparked fears in farmers that water decisions would be taken out of their hands. Those fears will need
to be addressed before any plan to curtail overdrafting will meet
with success.
Second, groundwater management should not be tied to threats
202. See e.g., D. GARDNER, AGRICULTURE IN CALIFORNIA WATER 11-36 (Engelbert 1982); CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S FINAL REPORT, supra note 2; GROUND WATER

RIGHTS, supra note 31; and Reis, Legal PlanningforGround Water Production 38 S.
CAL. LAW REV. 484 (1965).

203. City of Pasadena v. City of Alhambra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949);
City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 14 Cal. 3d 199, 537 P.2d 1250, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1975).
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of withholding additional supplies of surface water. By empowering the Water Resources Control Board to halt any interbasin
transfers of water prior to the approval of basin management and
implementation plans, Proposition 13 effectively would have
withheld surface water deliveries pending reductions of water demand in critical groundwater areas. 2°4 Farmers are unlikely to
acquiesce to any management plan that threatens to halt surface
deliveries. By allowing additionalsurface deliveries (i.e., those not
in existence prior to the enactment of new law) agricultural interests would be free to push for development of additional surface
water supplies, for example, through the Peripheral Canal or
north coast rivers. These supplies could be used for putting additional lands into agricultural production or to offset groundwater
pumping or for any other purposes.
Third, and related to the first two points, a politically viable
groundwater management program should not employ groundwater management as a land use planning mechanism. Proposition 13 would have prohibited the irrigation of new land, that is
land not irrigated for at least one growing season during the immediately preceding three calendar years. 20 5 Farmers understandably resist restrictions on how they manage their land,
particularly if the land was purchased with the intention of putting it into agricultural production at some later date. If additional surface supplies are made available, increased overall
irrigation within a critical groundwater management area is not
necessarily inconsistent with management to curtail overdraft.
The three points outlined above address three major objections
and reasons which the agricultural/local option groups had
against many past proposals to manage groundwater. Given the
political strength of the agricultural/local option groups, as was
evidenced by their ability to prevent changes in the way groundwater is managed, any future management plan should address
these objections.

VI.

A PROPOSAL

One might wonder how local discretion, a lack of prohibitions
on developing surface supplies and no limitations on putting new
land into agriculture, would be consistent with groundwater management to curtail overdrafting. What follows is an outline of a
management plan designed to curtail overdrafting and satisfy
204. Water Act, supra note 149, at § 15341.
205. Id. at § 15350.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol20/iss2/3

32

Smith: Rewriting California Groundwater Law: Past Attempts and Prerequis

CALIFORNIAS WESTERN LW REVIEW

[Vol. 20

most of the objections of the agricultural/local option groups to
previous management plans.
First, where the objective being sought is groundwater management to prevent overdrafting, any management plan, to be politically viable, should limit itself to that objective and not attempt
other agricultural or water development reforms.
Moreover, the three conditions addressed earlier can be met if
state levels of involvement are limited to monitoring groundwater
withdrawals and withholding some deliveries of surface water if
basin-wide rates of extraction do not decline over a period of
years. This can be accomplished in the following ways: first, reasonable expectations of decreases in groundwater pumping should
be established and implemented over a period of time sufficient to
allow farmers to make comfortable and economic transistions to
less dependence on groundwater. Using current estimates of overdraft in a given critical groundwater basin, targets should be established for reductions in those amounts for every five-year
period. For example, a beginning target might be a one percent
reduction per year in basin-wide overdrafting for the first ten
years-resulting in a ten percent decline in overdrafting over ten
years. During the second ten-year period the rate could be increased to two percent, resulting in a thirty percent reduction in
overdrafting over twenty years. During the third ten-year period
the rate could be increased to three percent reduction, resulting in
a sixty percent reduction in overdrafting after thirty years and finally during the final ten-year period the rate could be increased
percent reduction in
to four percent, resulting in a20 one-hundred
6
years.
forty
over
overdrafting
The state's role would be limited to monitoring rates of extraction and estimating a basin's progress at meeting the ten-year
goals. In the event a ten-year goal was not met, delivery of surface water could be curtailed in an amount equal to the difference
between the ten-year goal and actual reductions in groundwater
pumping. The base from which to determine any necessary reductions in surface water deliveries would be the average deliveries to a critical groundwater area over the five years prior to
passage of the management plan. In other words increases in surface water deliveries, above and beyond existing deliveries, would
not be affected.
There would be a number of advantages for this type of plan.
The initial goal for a reduction in overdraft would be low enough
206. Nothing is special about the percentages and periods listed here. They do,
however, seem to allow a gradual transition to decreased groundwater use over a
reasonably long period.
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(ten percent over ten years) to allow pumpers ample time to develop alternative supplies (e.g., through conservation, reclamation, crop substitution, or surface water) and should therefore
have a minimal impact on the agricultural economy.
In addition the plan would give the pumpers or their representatives complete discretion as to meeting the reduction goals while
taking into account the particular needs and desires within critical
groundwater areas. The groundwater users are in a much better
position in regard to any outside authoritiy to determine the most
desirable mix of measures designed to decrease dependence on
groundwater. Within critical groundwater areas local groundwater management authorities with powers to control overdrafting
may need to be created absent voluntary compliance with management goals like, for example, the Orange County Water District which has powers to require data from pumpers, regulate
pumping patterns, and levy pump taxes.20 7 However, the form of
management, that is the new water districts or coordination between existing districts with the cooperation of pumpers, would be
at the discretion of people in the critical groundwater area.
There are a number of reasons this plan might be more acceptable to agriculture in light of past opposition to state management
of groundwater wells. First, past concerns of farmers over local
control, or the fear of state control by "outsiders" should not be as
great under the proposed plan. Second, the plan will allow agricultural interests to pursue the development of additional surface
supplies. If successful in that pursuit, they can use the water for
increased agricultural expansion. Finally, the plan described
herein will allow for a gradual reduction in groundwater pumping
over an extended period and should not, therefore, disrupt the agricultural economy.
An additional reason farmers may be more receptive to groundwater management is the consequences of allowing the status quo
to continue indefinitely. Ultimately, all groundwater basins reach
a "steady state" wherein withdrawals equal the amount of water
returning to the basin. If an aquifer is pumped dry, further extractions will necessarily have to be equal to rates of replenishment. The decision of when to limit rates of withdrawal to rates
of replenishment determines at what level a given groundwater
basin will reach a steady state. If that decision is made when aquifer levels are low (i.e., after many years of overdrafting) the costs
of pumping the water will be greater than they would have been if
the decision to limit pumping was made when water levels are
207. CAL. WATER UNCOD. AcTs, Act 5683.
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Essentially, uncontrolled groundwater pumping is only forestalling the inevitable. A steady state will eventually be reached
and, absent some groundwater control, may unfortunately be
reached when aquifers are low and pumping costs high.
It is unlikely that farmers will pump their aquifers dry. Prior to
reaching that form of steady state, market forces will likely curtail
groundwater pumping. Since water levels decline and pumping
costs increase, it will simply be uneconomical to use groundwater
for all forms of irrigation.
In addition, declining water levels may cause agricultural lenders to question the value of farmland with uncertain sources of
water for collateral. A similar situation faced farmers in Roswell,
New Mexico, during the 1920's. Technological developments and
cheap energy facilitated increased groundwater pumping throughout New Mexico during the 1920's. In the 125,000-acre Roswell
basin, large pumps and numerous uncontrolled wells were ruining
artesian pressures and putting many farmers out of business.
Lacking adequate water supplies, these farmers were unable to secure loans
to continue operation or to dig the newly necessary
09
wells.

2

In California one of the state's largest agricultural lenders,
Bank of America, has already sent out signals indicating the current situation cannot continue indefinitely. During the Proposition 13 campaign Bank of America opposed the initiative but
warned farm organizations that the decision to oppose Propostion
13 was a close one and that absent water reforms "the next time
around" a proposal such as Proposition 13 "might be such that it
would merit strong support" from the bank.210
CONCLUSION

Existing California groundwater law has provided a useful tool
for the management of groundwater supplies to prevent overdrafting in many parts of the state. In large parts of the state, however,
primarily in the agriculturally-rich San Joaquin Valley, groundwater managers have been unable or unwilling to regulate
groundwater pumping to prevent overdraft. This resistance is
often based on two interrelated concerns. First, individual
groundwater pumpers and water agencies involved in groundwater extraction resist state interference with local control. Sec208. Pumping costs are greater because of the need for new and deeper wells,
more powerful pumps and more energy required to lift the water from greater depths.
209. Clark, Ground Water Law.- Problem Areas 8 NAT. REs. LAW. 377 (1975).
210. L.A. Times, Nov. 5, 1982, at 3.
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ond, these same individuals and entities resist any imposition of
state restriction on groundwater pumping absent assurance that
additional surface water supplies will be made available to offset
decreased groundwater extraction.
It is clear that given the rate of overdrafting in California and
the serious environmental, economic and social costs associated
with a continuance of long term overdrafting, some solution to the
problem must be found. Although the proposals contained herein
may not necessarily be more successful than previous proposals,
these and others must be tested to curtail the undesirable consequences of groundwater overdraft.
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